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Abortion, Family Planning, 
and Population Policy: 




OVER TIME and in different places, those formulating population policy have 
produced widely divergent assessments of induced abortion: a murderous act 
that ends a human life; a treasonous act damaging to the interests of the state; 
an injurious act threatening the health and future fertility of a woman; an 
inefficient means of birth control that should be replaced by modern contra-
ceptives; an efficient means of birth control that can contribute significantly 
to both individual and societal fertility control; a necessary option to deal with 
occasional contraceptive failure; a health-promoting act when provided by 
competent medical personnel; and an individual woman’s right that should be 
protected by the state. For the past several decades those engaged in shaping 
the Program of Action documents at international conferences on population 
have muted their voices when the topic of abortion has been raised. Great care 
has been taken to define “family planning” and “birth control” in ways that 
explicitly exclude abortion, although a strong semantic case could be made 
that abortion is in the service of both. Any advocacy of antinatalist population 
policies in such documents has included proscriptions on the use of abortion as 
a means of family planning and on claims that expanding access to contracep-
tion will reduce the number of abortions. This “common-ground” compromise 
on abortion has remained in place even as the extent of the practice of induced 
abortion has become more widely known, as the role induced abortion plays 
in fertility transitions has become better understood, and as more women 
have gained enhanced access to legal abortion that permits its use as a means 
of fertility control. This article has three goals: to examine the appropriateness 
of these directives with respect to what is currently known about the relation-
ship between abortion, family planning, and population policy; to trace how 
this “contraception-only” definition of family planning became de rigueur 
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at international population conferences; and to explore the prospects for the 
emergence of a more appropriate common-ground approach.
The interplay of abortion, family planning,  
and population policy
Accurate estimates of both legal and illegal abortions are difficult to make. 
Even in countries where legal abortions are easy to obtain, some procedures 
usually take place in private settings and go unreported in national statistics. 
In countries where access to legal abortion is highly restricted, the vast major-
ity of abortions are illegal and do not appear in official statistics. The number 
of illegal abortions has to be estimated from a combination of survey data, 
hospital-based studies, and analyses of maternal mortality rates. A research 
team at the Guttmacher Institute has been regularly compiling statistics on 
worldwide legal abortions. Their latest report (Sedgh et al. 2007b) estimates 
that 22 million legal abortions occurred in 2003 and includes country-
specific data. The five countries with the most legal abortions were: China 
(7,215,000), India (2,400,000), Russia (1,504,000), United States (1,287,000), 
and Vietnam (540,000).1 For the past 25 years the World Health Organization 
has maintained a database on unsafe and illegal abortions and has published 
worldwide estimates on a regular basis. Its latest estimates can be found in 
the 5th edition of Unsafe Abortion (WHO 2007). It estimates that 20 million 
illegal abortions occurred in 2003 and presents estimates for regions but not 
for countries.2 A combined effort by members of the Guttmacher and WHO 
research teams (Sedgh et al. 2007a: 1342) presents sub-regional estimates of 
both legal and illegal abortions occurring in 2003. 
According to these best estimates, of the 210 million pregnancies in the 
world each year, approximately 130 million result in live births, 38 million 
in spontaneous abortions and still births, 22 million in legal abortions, and 
20 million in illegal abortions (WHO 2007: 1–4). About 80 million of these 
annual pregnancies are estimated to be unintended, so induced abortion, 
legal and illegal, currently is being used to end somewhat more than half the 
world’s unintended pregnancies.
Although women are clearly using abortion as a major means of control-
ling their fertility, since the 1984 Mexico City International Conference on 
Population (United Nations 1984: 767) all international population conferenc-
es’ Program of Action documents have contained the same policy directive: 
“...in no case should [abortion] be promoted as a method of family planning.” 
Section 8.25 of the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and 
Development’s Programme of Action included this directive and additionally 
characterized family planning as an anti-abortion endeavor: “All governments 
and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are 
urged … to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved 
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family-planning services.” Those seeking a consensus program of action at 
Cairo took this position in order to sidestep entanglement in a bitter debate 
over the morality of abortion. The hope was that all participants might unite 
behind a common-ground effort to improve access to modern contraceptives 
that would simultaneously enhance fertility control and reduce the “problem” 
of abortion. Both the Cairo+5 and the Cairo+10 documents (UN 1999: 625; 
UNFPA 2005: 80–81) continue this strategy with only minor modifications. A 
similar tension exists in World Health Organization forums and documents. 
In its latest edition of Unsafe Abortion (WHO 2007: 20) the WHO still recom-
mends that governments “reduce the recourse to abortion by expanding and 
improving family planning services,” language that is nearly identical to that 
found in the Cairo Programme of Action. Despite this international support for 
a contraception-only approach to family planning, an increasing number of 
countries permit abortions “on request” or for “economic or social reasons,” 
the result of a worldwide liberalization of abortion laws that began in the 
late 1960s. 
The following analysis of contemporary abortion policies uses the United 
Nations database, World Population Policies 2007 (United Nations 2008), but 
excludes countries with populations of less than 100,000 from the analysis. 
The UN Population Division has maintained a country-specific database on 
abortion policies for over a decade, examining each country’s criminal code 
as well as any public health or medical ethics codes that affect the applica-
tion of abortion laws in particular situations. A three-volume work, Abortion 
Policies: A Global Review (United Nations 2002), contains treatments of the 
specific grounds on which each country permits abortion, duration-of-preg-
nancy limitations for specific grounds, a history of the country’s abortion 
policies, and an assessment of its implementation of those policies. Seven 
standard grounds are used to categorize when countries permit abortion: to 
save the life of the woman, to preserve physical health, to preserve mental 
health, rape or incest, fetal impairment, for economic or social reasons, and 
on request. Every country places some duration-of-pregnancy limitations 
on when legal abortions are permitted, except for cases where the woman’s 
life is in danger. In all cases where countries permit abortion on request or 
for economic or social reasons, the permission exists for a limited gestational 
period, in the range of 10 to 24 weeks. Denmark’s abortion regulations are 
an example of such distinctions (United Nations 2002: 124–125). A woman 
can obtain an abortion on request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, 
but thereafter abortion is permitted only when “necessary to avert a risk to 
her life or of serious deterioration to her physical or mental health, and this 
risk is based solely or principally on circumstances of a medical character,” or 
when approved by a committee. The committee usually grants permission if 
the pregnancy resulted from a criminal act, or if significant fetal abnormality 
exists, or if the mother is not likely to be able to provide care to a child because 
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of her mental or physical disability or extreme youth. Either by limiting the 
allowable reasons for abortion or by offering greater protection of fetal rights 
as the gestation period increases, all states recognize that a difference exists 
between abortion and contraception. Contraception and abortion are most 
similar in terms of state regulation in those countries permitting abortion on 
request or for economic or social reasons when these abortions occur within 
the stipulated gestational period since documentation of an economic or social 
reason is rarely if ever required. Although some countries permitting abortion 
“to preserve mental health” liberally interpret its meaning and thereby grant 
women relatively uncomplicated access to legal abortion, many countries 
permitting abortion for that reason are not so liberal in their interpretation. 
Therefore for this analysis having “uncomplicated access to legal abortion” is 
defined as living in a country that permits abortion on request or for economic 
or social reasons. Such permission always comes with some gestational limita-
tions and is subject to varying specifications by national legislation. In many 
“uncomplicated access” countries, a woman who discovers her pregnancy 
late, or who has difficulty finding an abortion facility, or who cannot afford a 
legal abortion still might find her access anything but “uncomplicated.”
The World Population Policies 2007 database contains updated UN informa-
tion on each country’s 2007 abortion policies, its 1996 abortion policies, its 
population policies with respect to size and growth, age structure and spatial 
distribution, fertility levels, mortality levels, and migration levels for 1976, 
1986, 1996, and 2007, as well as UN estimates of each country’s relevant 
demographic and health measures for those four years. The data in the fol-
lowing figures and tables come from this database, apart from the several 
exceptions noted in Table 1. 
Governments make laws, and examining changes in the percent of 
countries with particular abortion policies is a meaningful way of measuring 
policy change. But if one uses only the country as the unit of analysis when 
examining the distribution of particular abortion policies, misleading policy 
assessments can result. The great variation in population size among coun-
tries, from 100,000 to 1.3 billion in this case, means that the percent of the 
world’s population living under a particular abortion policy is determined 
more by the population sizes of countries with that policy rather than by 
the number of such countries. To obtain the clearest understanding of global 
abortion policy, one must use both countries and percent of population as 
units of analysis. Figures 1–6 reflect this need. 
Figure 1 indicates that in 2007, 56 of the 179 countries (31 percent) 
in the world with populations of more than 100,000 permitted abortion on 
request and 67 countries (37 percent) permitted abortion for economic or 
social reasons. At the national level, therefore, somewhat over a third of all 
countries have granted women the legal right to use abortion as a means of 
fertility control rather than only to preserve their lives and health or as a re-
D E N N I S  H O D G S O N  483
sponse to fetal abnormality or sexual assault. Among countries, the general 
liberalization trend that began in the late 1960s has continued over the last 
decade. The number of countries permitting abortion for every reason, except 
for the nearly universally permitted reason of saving the woman’s life, was 
greater in 2007 than in 1996. The most significant change was in the number 
To save woman’s life
To preserve physical health
To preserve mental health
Rape or incest
Fetal impairment
Economic or social reasons
On request


















SOURCE: United Nations, World Population Policies 2007 (all countries 100,000 or more population);
«http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2007/Publication_index.htm».
FIGURE 1   Percent of countries permitting abortion for various reasons, 1996
and 2007
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SOURCE: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 2   Percent of world’s population living in countries permitting
abortion for various reasons, 1996 and 2007
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of countries permitting abortion to preserve mental health, increasing from 
94 (53 percent) in 1996 to 118 (66 percent) in 2007. 
Figure 2 changes the unit of analysis to the percent of the world popula-
tion living in countries with various abortion policies. This change leads to dif-
ferent assessments of the distribution of abortion policies; the most notable is 
that from a population perspective roughly three-fifths of the world’s women 
currently have uncomplicated access to legal abortion. Interestingly, the lib-
eralizing trend from 1996 to 2007 that was evident in the country analysis in 
Figure 1 is not evident in the population analysis of Figure 2. “Uncomplicated 
access” percentages actually have declined somewhat from 1996 to 2007. The 
reason for these contrary trends lies in the fact that countries with uncompli-
cated access to legal abortion tend to be found in areas of the world, such as 
Europe and North America, with noticeably slower rates of population growth 
than those areas that place greater restrictions on women’s access to abortion, 
such as Africa and Latin America. The proportion of women currently having 
uncomplicated access to legal abortion will continue to decline unless more 
countries, especially more populous countries, begin permitting abortion for 
economic or social reasons.
Figures 3 and 4 document variation in uncomplicated access to legal 
abortion by region. The most significant feature is that, whether using a 
country measure (Figure 3) or a percent of population measure (Figure 4), 
restricted access to legal abortion is most notable in the 52 African countries 
and the 30 Latin American/Caribbean countries. Women in these regions 
have also experienced the least change in their access to legal abortion over 
the last decade. As shown in Figure 4, as of 2007 only 2 percent of Latin 
American/Caribbean women have uncomplicated access to legal abortion, a 
slightly smaller fraction than in 1996. This decline is occurring even though by 
2007 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines joined the four other countries in this 
region (Barbados, Belize, Cuba, and Guyana) that allowed uncomplicated ac-
cess to abortion in 1996; the population living under more restrictive abortion 
policies is growing more rapidly than the population in these five countries. 
A similar pattern is evident for Africa, where only 7 percent of women have 
uncomplicated access to legal abortion in 2007 compared to 8 percent in 1996, 
even though the same four out of 52 countries permitted uncomplicated 
access in both time periods: South Africa, Cape Verde, Tunisia, and Zambia. 
For Europe and North America a very high percentage of countries permit 
uncomplicated access to abortion, and a very high percentage of women have 
uncomplicated access to abortion. In 2007 just four countries in these regions 
did not permit abortion for economic or social reasons: Ireland, Malta, Poland, 
and Spain. In Asia even though a minority of countries (40 percent) grant 
women uncomplicated access to abortion, a substantial majority of Asian 
women (73 percent) have uncomplicated access. This is so because China, 
with a 20 percent share of the world’s population in 2007, and India, with an 
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18 percent share, both have liberal abortion policies and together constitute 
62 percent of the population residing in the 47 Asian countries. Only about 
29 percent of women in the 45 other Asian countries had uncomplicated 























SOURCE: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 3   Percent of countries in each world region permitting























SOURCE: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 4   Percent of population in each world region living in
countries permitting abortion on request or for economic or social
reasons, 1996 and 2007
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4 can largely be explained by Australia having a liberal abortion policy and 
constituting over 60 percent of that region’s population. 
Figure 5 documents a clear relationship between a country’s develop-
ment level and its abortion policy. Only four of the 48 countries classified as 














SOURCE: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 5   Percent of countries in each development category permitting














SOURCE: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 6   Percent of the population in each development category
living in countries permitting abortion on request or for economic or
social reasons, 1996 and 2007
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abortion: Cambodia, Cape Verde, Nepal, and Zambia. This compares to 23 
of the 86 countries classified as less developed (27 percent) and 40 of the 
45 countries classified as more developed (89 percent). Figure 6 documents 
that women in the least developed world had much more limited access to 
uncomplicated legal abortion in 2007 (7 percent) than women in the more 
developed world (93 percent). Women’s relatively high access to uncompli-
cated abortion in the less developed world (61 percent) needs further analysis. 
This high percentage is largely the result of the fact that both China and India, 
with their huge populations and liberal abortion policies, are classified as less 
developed; together they constitute 55 percent of the population residing in 
all 86 less developed countries. Only about 16 percent of women in the 84 
other less developed countries had uncomplicated access to abortion in 2007, 
a percentage more similar to that of women in the least developed world than 
of women in the more developed world. In 2007 the population of women in 
the least developed world with uncomplicated access to abortion had a lower 
annual population growth rate (1.9 percent vs. 2.4 percent) and a lower total 
fertility rate (3.7 vs. 4.8) than women with more restricted access to abortion. 
The same situation holds true for women in the less developed world: women 
with uncomplicated access to abortion had a lower annual population growth 
rate (1.0 percent vs. 1.5 percent) and a lower total fertility rate (2.2 vs. 2.9) 
than women with more restricted access to abortion. Clearly, the populations 
in these two development categories with more restrictive abortion laws are 
at earlier stages of their fertility transitions.
This clear association between restricted access to legal abortion, lower 
levels of development, higher rates of population growth, and higher total 
fertility rates presents a challenge for those who wish to formulate population 
and reproductive health policies that serve the health needs of women. From 
what we know about the role induced abortion normally plays in fertility 
transitions, women in populations that are in the early and middle stages of 
their fertility transitions are most likely to experience increasing numbers of 
unwanted pregnancies and increasing numbers of induced abortions. 
During periods of rapid decline in desired family size, common to the 
early and middle stages of the fertility transition, the potential for unintended 
pregnancies increases significantly as women desire to be pregnant for smaller 
and smaller portions of their reproductive years (Bongaarts and Westoff 2000: 
194; Sedgh et al. 2007b: 113–114). Countries in the early and middle stages 
of their fertility transition commonly have simultaneous increases in use of 
both contraception and induced abortion since women rely on both to keep 
their actual fertility in line with rapidly declining desired fertility. That current 
abortion policies tend to be most restrictive in developing-country popula-
tions in the early to middle stages of their fertility transition has meant that 
the vast majority of abortions in such populations are illegal and therefore 
much less safe. 
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This health problem exists because prohibiting abortion simply to end 
unwanted pregnancies has not prevented women from using abortion for 
this purpose. In 2003 in Africa 98 percent of all abortions were illegal, and 
these 5.5 million illegal abortions ended 12 percent of all pregnancies. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean 95 percent of abortions in 2003 were illegal, and 
these 3.9 million abortions ended 21 percent of all pregnancies (Sedgh et al. 
2007a: 1342). Evidence suggests that a woman who is pregnant and does 
not want to give birth will strive to accomplish her goal regardless of legal 
barriers. But abortion restrictions do have an impact. Their most significant 
effect is on the health of women who obtain abortions. The World Health 
Organization estimates that in Africa in 2003 the case–fatality rate (deaths 
per 100,000 abortion procedures) was 650 for women receiving illegal abor-
tions, and in Latin America and the Caribbean it was 50. This compares with 
a case–fatality rate of 0.6 for legal abortions performed in the United States 
(WHO 2007: 18). An estimated 65,000 to 70,000 women die each year as 
a result of complications from unsafe abortions, 5 million suffer a period of 
disability, 3 million experience reproductive tract infections, and 1.7 million 
experience secondary infertility (WHO 2007: 5). Restricted access to abor-
tion also results in more unwanted pregnancies coming to term than would 
be the case if abortion were more freely available. Where access to legal 
abortion is uncomplicated, the vast majority of women who attempt to end 
an unwanted pregnancy usually succeed, even in developing countries. For 
example in Mongolia, where abortion is freely available, the 1998 Reproduc-
tive Health Survey reported that only 2 to 3 percent of women attempting to 
end an unwanted pregnancy failed to do so. In most cases significantly higher 
proportions of women fail to end unwanted pregnancies where access to legal 
abortion is more highly restricted (WHO 2007: 4). 
That demand for abortion tends to increase during the early and middle 
stages of fertility transitions should be an important consideration for those 
formulating population policies. Countries in those stages of their fertility 
transition are the most likely to adopt policies to lower their fertility, ones 
aimed at fostering small-family norms and stimulating rapid declines in 
desired family size. The 2007 total fertility rate of the population living in 
countries with a policy to lower fertility (those I refer to here as antinatalist 
countries) is 3.3, compared to a TFR of 2.7 for the population living in coun-
tries with a fertility policy of no intervention, a TFR of 1.9 for the population 
living in countries with a policy to maintain fertility, and a TFR of 1.4 for the 
population living in countries with a policy to raise fertility. Currently 47 per-
cent of the world’s population live in countries with a policy to lower fertility, 
a statistic that does not include China’s 20 percent of the world’s population. 
China’s official 2007 policy is to maintain, not lower, its current fertility rate, 
given by the UN as 1.7. Two-thirds of the 72 countries with a policy to lower 
fertility are African and Latin American/Caribbean countries, 94 percent of 
which restrict access to legal abortion. None of the ten antinatalist countries 
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in Latin America and the Caribbean3 and only three of the 38 antinatalist 
countries in Africa4 permit abortion on request or for economic or social 
reasons. These countries have encoded in their legal systems the admonition 
that abortion should not be viewed as a means of family planning. Although 
they have adopted policies to induce more women to have smaller families, 
they have made it illegal to end a pregnancy simply because it is unwanted. 
This combination of population and abortion policies is a clear contraception-
only fertility control policy; even when contraceptive failure is the cause of 
a pregnancy, as happens to an estimated 26 million women annually (WHO 
2003: 13), abortion is not permitted. 
When policymakers from these countries turn to Program of Action 
documents adopted at international conferences on population, even the 
recent Cairo+5 and Cairo+10 documents (UN 1999: 625; UNFPA 2005: 
80–81), they find no discussion of the relationship between likely numbers 
of abortions and stage of the fertility transition. They simply find the com-
mon-ground directives that “...in no case should [abortion] be promoted as 
a method of family planning,” and that it is possible “to reduce the recourse 
to abortion through expanded and improved family-planning services.” Yet 
the best evidence indicates that reality is more complicated than the direc-
tives suggest. A dynamic relationship exists between contraceptive prevalence 
rates and abortion. Both tend to increase in the early and middle stages of the 
fertility transition. An inverse relationship can only be expected to develop 
in the later stages of the fertility transition when sterilization commonly is 
used to end childbearing and when child spacing is accomplished by well 
over half of reproductive-age women using highly effective modern means 
of contraception. Countries initially instituting effective antinatalist policies 
that induce couples to want smaller families, even if they facilitate access to 
contraception, can expect the number of induced abortions to increase along 
with contraceptive use. With desired family size declining rapidly, women 
have a new and urgent need for contraception but often must overcome 
cultural barriers to its use, take time to find out where to obtain it, and learn 
how to use it correctly. During this period, unintended pregnancies are likely 
to increase in number and unwantedness. Often there is a simultaneous 
increase in the age at marriage, and women face more years during which 
they are unmarried and sexually active. Unmarried sexually active women 
face additional barriers to gaining access to contraception and additional rea-
sons for wanting to end unintended pregnancies. It is predictable, therefore, 
that more women will seek abortions when desired family size is declining 
rapidly. Considering their stage in the fertility transition, it is not unexpected 
that 600,000 more African women sought abortions in 2003 than in 1995 
(Sedgh et al. 2007a: 1341). 
The common-ground directive that “in no case should [abortion] be pro-
moted as a method of family planning” makes it difficult to present evidence 
at international population conferences that uncomplicated access to legal 
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abortion actually allows women in countries attempting to spread a small-
family norm to accomplish their new reproductive goals in a more healthful 
manner. Table 1, for instance, suggests that demonstrable demographic and 
health benefits are associated with antinatalist policies that are in place in 
countries  where women have uncomplicated access to legal abortion. Except 
for the “number of countries” and “percent of countries” data, all measures 
in Table 1 are “percent of population” measures.5
Note that the 43 percent of the population in antinatalist countries with 
uncomplicated access to abortion has a 28 percent lower per capita income 
($2,426) than the 57 percent of the corresponding population with more re-
stricted access to abortion ($3,363). This marked difference in development 
level makes the following statistics all the more remarkable. The population 
with uncomplicated access has a 22 percent lower total fertility rate (2.8 vs. 
3.6) and a 21 percent lower total annual rate of population growth (1.5 per-
TABLE 1 Cross-tabulation of demographic and health measures 
of populations living in countries with a policy to lower fertility, 
according to whether or not countries permit abortion on request or 
for economic or social reasons, 2007
 Abortion permitted on 
 request or for economic 
  or social reasons
 Yes No Total
Number of countries 10 62 72
Percent of countries 14 86 100
Percent of population in antinatalist countries 43 57 100
Percent of world’s population 20 27 47
Population growth rate 1.5 1.9 1.7
Total fertility rate 2.8 3.6 3.3
Female life expectancy 66.5 64.7 65.5
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births) 53 55 54
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000 births) 75 83 80
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 births) 438 502c 475
Percent using modern contraceptiona 49d 37e 42
Percent using any contraceptiona 57d 44e 50
GNI per capita, ppp 2006b $2,426f $3,363g $2,958
aReproductive-age women: World Contraceptive Use 2007, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division; «http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/contraceptive2007/contracep-
tive2007.htm» 
bGross national income per capita, ppp (current international $), 2006 data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators database; «http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/» 
cdata missing for .03 percent of the population (Micronesia, Samoa, Vanuatu) 
ddata missing for .063 percent of the population (Fiji) 
edata missing for .058 percent of the population (Micronesia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) 
f data missing for .057 percent of the population (Bahrain) 
gdata missing for 1.11 percent of the population (Congo, Oman, Zimbabwe) 
SOURCE: See Figure 1. 
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cent vs. 1.9 percent). The higher total fertility rate of the antinatalist popu-
lation with more restricted access to legal abortion indicates that it is in the 
earlier stages of its fertility transition, when increasing numbers of women 
are likely to find themselves with unwanted pregnancies. Although accurate 
estimates of illegal abortion are not available at the country level, the popu-
lation living under more restrictive abortion policies has a 15 percent higher 
maternal mortality ratio than the population with uncomplicated access (502 
versus 438 deaths per 100,000 live births), suggesting that significant numbers 
of women in this population might be resorting to harmful illegal abortions. 
In fact, even with a significantly lower per capita income, all the mortality 
measures of the population with uncomplicated access  are superior to those 
of the population with restricted access: a 4 percent lower infant mortality 
rate, a 10 percent lower under-5 mortality rate, and a 3 percent higher female 
life expectancy. Additionally, the population with uncomplicated access has 
a 30 percent higher use rate of “any contraception” and a 32 percent higher 
use rate of “modern contraception” than the population with restricted access. 
There is no evidence that easier access to legal abortion is causing women 
to forgo practicing contraception or that restricting access to legal abortion is 
causing women to seek out contraception in greater numbers. Evidence sug-
gests that women in antinatalist countries that restrict access to abortion have 
lower contraceptive use rates, poorer health conditions, and higher fertility 
than women living in antinatalist countries with uncomplicated abortion ac-
cess, and that these differences cannot be explained by economic factors.
The current common-ground approach to abortion adopted at interna-
tional population conferences inhibits forthright discussion of the interplay 
of abortion, contraception, and population policy. The directive that all gov-
ernments should “reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and 
improved family-planning services” might be politically useful, but it makes 
it difficult to talk about those stages of fertility transition when contraceptive 
use and abortion can be expected to increase together. The directive meant to 
rally support for expanding access to contraception—“abortion should never 
be used as a means of family planning”—makes it inconvenient to acknowl-
edge that millions of women currently are doing just that, or that some coun-
tries allowing such a use are probably experiencing health and demographic 
benefits as a result. It is easy to understand the political reasons why such 
topics have been avoided at international population conferences, especially 
when the avoidance was reinforced by provisions of the Mexico City Policy 
of the United States, but maintaining silence on these topics has always had 
its costs. Even policymakers who view abortion as an act of taking a human 
life, and who are not likely to change the highly restrictive abortion policies 
that flow from that moral position, have something to gain from open forums 
that disseminate the best information available on the likely consequences of 
particular abortion and population policies. Discussion of the health costs as-
492  A B O R T I O N ,  F A M I LY  P L A N N I N G ,  A N D  P O P U L AT I O N  P O L I C Y
sociated with undergoing a fertility transition with restrictive abortion policies 
will allow even these policymakers to better plan for the increase in unsafe 
abortions they are likely to experience. Avoiding these topics probably has 
never served the best interests of policymakers, but continuing to contain all 
discussions of abortion, family planning, and population policy within the 
confines of these two common-ground directives is becoming increasingly 
untenable. Too many facts simply cannot be made to conform to them.
Considering the highly charged politics that surrounds the issue of abor-
tion at both the national and international levels, a debate over whether a 
new common-ground approach is needed is likely to be controversial, and 
perhaps as contentious as any debate over what that new approach ought 
to entail. Tracing how the contraception-only definition of family planning 
became de rigueur at international population conferences is a useful first 
step in determining whether the present is an auspicious time to revisit past 
compromises. Such a history might also help to identify some components of 
a new common-ground approach. 
The origins of a contraception-only  
population policy
Induced abortion has always been a significant factor affecting numbers of 
births and population growth rates (Himes 1932: 49; Davis and Blake 1956: 
229–230; Frejka 1985: 230). Historically, women have used abortion to deal 
with a personal problem that the state often ignored and occasionally penal-
ized. In the twentieth century when states began to formulate explicit popula-
tion policies, the demographic significance of abortion made it more difficult 
for the state to ignore. When populations faced stagnant growth or the pros-
pect of actual population decline, concerned policymakers often saw abortion 
as a harmful act for both society and the individual. Occasionally laws outlaw-
ing abortion were combined with ones that barred the use of contraceptives 
to form a coercive pronatalist policy. When populations experienced rapid 
growth, policymakers concerned about resource shortages, unemployment, 
and economic stagnation often saw abortion as a health-promoting act for 
both society and the individual, and worked to make abortion, along with 
contraception, more readily available to women as part of a comprehensive 
antinatalist policy. In short, during the twentieth century at the national 
level, abortion policy became a potentially powerful means to accomplish a 
variety of population policy ends, and policymakers’ willingness to use it as 
such has caused them to see abortion in different lights. Late in the twenti-
eth century reproductive rights movements in many countries attempted to 
refocus discussions of fertility control at the level of individual women. From 
a reproductive rights perspective, control of fertility is an individual woman’s 
right that never should be overruled in pursuit of state interests. 
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A contraception-only antinatalist population policy was first promoted 
by the international population control movement that arose in certain mod-
ern industrialized countries after World War II. Rapid mortality decline in 
the developing world was causing very rapid population growth. Movement 
leaders thought that such growth threatened the economic and political well-
being of less developed countries and sought to convince both developed- and 
developing-world governments to support family planning programs in these 
still predominantly agrarian societies. By the early 1960s family planning 
came to be defined in exclusively contraception-only terms and as a program 
that could not only reduce population growth but could reduce illegal abor-
tion as well. The decision to define family planning as contraception only 
and anti-abortion was deliberate and, no doubt, seemed the prudent decision 
to make at the time. Movement leaders were familiar with several national 
integrated abortion and population policies then in place: France’s coercive 
pronatalist policy that included restriction of access to both contraception 
and abortion in an attempt to produce larger families; and Japan’s antinatalist 
policy adopted in the period immediately after World War II that included 
the decriminalization of contraception and abortion in an explicit attempt to 
lower a problematically high rate of population growth. A brief digression to 
examine these two national integrated programs is useful for two reasons. 
First, it reveals the thinking of two sets of policymakers who viewed abortion 
quite differently. With contemporary international population policy discus-
sions increasingly having both an antinatalist and a pronatalist dimension, 
such an expansive understanding of policymakers’ perspectives on abortion 
is important. Second, it gives insight into how movement leaders during the 
1950s and 1960s used what was known about abortion and population policy 
when fashioning their initial antinatalist policy recommendations. When 
reviewing this history it is important to remember that it occurred in a policy 
environment in which women’s voices were largely unheard.
French pronatalism
Early in the twentieth century, France had an active birth control movement, 
the production and sale of contraceptives were legal, and French fertility, in de-
cline for about a century, was low (Accampo 2003). After the devastating mili-
tary loses suffered in World War I, however, France’s persistent worry over the 
prospect of depopulation turned to despair. In 1920 the French government, 
advised and aided by French population experts, enacted a strongly pronatalist 
population policy that sought to encourage fertility through a combination of 
positive programs that enhanced couples’ ability to care for children (Watson 
1954) and repressive programs that limited couples’ access to contraception 
and abortion (Watson 1952). My focus is on the repressive programs because 
they explicitly linked abortion policy and population policy.
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The law of 13 February 1920 made manufacturing, selling, or advocat-
ing the use of contraceptives illegal, punishable by fines or imprisonment. 
The French birth control movement found itself under systematic attack and 
with little public support. Abortion before that time was illegal, with harsh 
penalties specified, but few juries convicted abortion providers and abortions 
were frequent. Amendments to Article 317 of the Penal Code, the article that 
made abortion illegal, were enacted in 1923 to rectify that situation. The 1923 
amendments eliminated jury trials for abortion cases and set jail terms for 
women obtaining abortions at six months to two years and for abortion pro-
viders at one to five years. Physicians performing abortions could also be per-
manently barred from practicing medicine. Convictions increased, although 
even under the new amendments obtaining evidence was still difficult. Fewer 
medical personnel performed abortions under the new laws but abortions 
remained common, estimates ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 a year during 
the 1930s (Watson 1952: 265), a decade when the average annual number of 
live births was 671,000 (INEE 2009). The estimated abortion ratio, then, was 
somewhere between 450 and 750 abortions per 1,000 live births.
At the end of the 1930s the Comité consultatif de la population was ap-
pointed to strengthen France’s coercive pronatalist population policy. It pro-
duced the Code de la famille in July 1939, shortly before France entered World 
War II. Its new laws were largely implemented by the government of Marshal 
Pétain. Under the Code de la famille, abortion was viewed as an anti-state act. 
Greater restrictions were to come. The law of 15 February 1942 made abor-
tion a crime against the state, comparable to sabotage and treason. As an 
“act against the material security of the State,” abortion cases were tried by a 
special Tribunal d’état whose decisions were final and whose penalties were to 
be imposed immediately (Watson 1952: 267). In July 1943 the Tribunal d’état 
had a Cherbourg laundress, Marie-Louise Giraud, put to death by guillotine 
for performing 26 abortions (Koos 1999: 21). It sentenced the three women 
who solicited customers for her to from five to ten years of forced labor. 
Still, abortions remained frequent. Debré and Sauvy (1946: 183) es-
timated that between 400,000 and 500,000 abortions were performed in 
1946, a year in which there were 844,000 live births in France (INEE 2009). 
The estimated abortion ratio was between 470 and 590 abortions per 1,000 
live births. The Code de la famille remained in effect after the war, and French 
population experts undertook studies aimed at identifying who was having 
abortions and why. Jean Sutter (1950) of INED (l’Institut national d’études dé-
mographiques) interviewed 3,000 women arriving at hospitals with post-abor-
tion complications from 1946 to 1949 and found that the average “abortee 
is a married woman with a small family” and that “the family appears to be 
a quite normal one” (Watson 1952: 275). These findings did not convince 
population experts that normal French wives needed access to modern con-
traception and legal abortions so as to be spared the health consequences 
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of repeated illegal abortions performed by ill-trained providers. The experts 
actually arrived at the opposite conclusion: restrictions on contraception 
needed to be maintained and the penalties for abortions strengthened. 
Clearly, few women’s voices were being heard, perhaps because women had 
only gained the right to vote in France in 1944 (Latham 2002: 17). The state’s 
pronatalist population policy was the preeminent concern of policymakers, 
and they viewed suppressing abortion to be a necessary component of that 
policy. Alfred Sauvy (1945: 297; Watson 1952: 285), then director of INED, 
was clear about this: “the repression of abortion, although it cannot be used 
alone, is according to German and Austrian experience the most effective 
and least onerous means of affecting natality.”  
The perception that the state needed more people produced a highly ar-
ticulated population and abortion policy. State needs, not individual desires, 
were of paramount importance. Jean Sutter implored couples to give their 
families “a size which finally will be in accord with the needs of the nation” 
(Watson 1952: 283). Paul Vincent, also of INED, classified “La famille normale” 
as one with three or four children, and argued that a large family, even if “for 
the most part involuntary,” was needed for France’s “demographic equilib-
rium” (1950: 266–268; Watson 1952: 285).
Not until 1967 was there a statutory provision for the legal distribution 
of contraceptive devices in France (Latham 2002: 53). By that time worries 
over depopulation had dissipated since France’s total fertility rate had been in 
the range of 2.6 to 2.8 for over 20 years. Women had also begun to mobilize 
and press for greater access to contraception. Dr. Marie-Andreé Weill-Hallé 
established her family planning association in 1956, and it quickly became 
a woman-focused national family planning association, Mouvement français 
pour le planning familial, which started distributing contraceptives to women 
despite the restrictive law. During his 1965 presidential campaign François 
Mitterrand included ending birth control restrictions as part of his platform 
(Latham 2002: 57–59, 71) and by 1967 the restrictions were gone. A law 
passed in January 1975, loi Veil, suspended Article 317 of the Penal Code un-
der certain circumstances. Pregnant French women in situations of “distress” 
could now obtain legal abortions during the first trimester of their pregnancies 
(Latham 2002: 94).6 France’s experiment with coercive pronatalist policies 
ended that year. In 2003 there were some 208,000 abortions in France (Sedgh 
et al. 2007b: 108) and 761,464 live births (INEE 2009) for a ratio of 273 
abortions per 1,000 live births, a considerably lower ratio than those estimated 
for the decades when nearly all abortions were illegal.7
Japanese antinatalism
Japanese fertility was declining in the early decades of the twentieth century 
(Whelpton 1950: 34). During the 1920s contraceptives were legally sold in 
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Japan, and information about contraception was widely distributed. Although 
initially rebuffed by officials, Margaret Sanger received approval by the Impe-
rial Diet to speak publicly on birth control during her 1922 tour (Gray 1979: 
185–188), a tour that served as a launching pad for the Japanese birth control 
movement led by Shidzue Ishimoto (Chesler 1992: 246; 365–367). But dur-
ing the 1930s Japan’s new militarist leaders wished to encourage population 
growth. They made a concerted effort to stop the spread of birth control 
information and used the police to prevent the sale of contraceptives (Dore 
1953: 82-83; Oakley 1978: 620–622). After Sanger’s second visit to Japan 
in 1937, Ishimoto was jailed for promoting “dangerous thoughts,” and her 
movement was outlawed (Chesler 1992: 367). The crude birth rate rebounded 
a bit from 1940 to 1941, but declined during the war years, reaching a low 
of 23.2 in 1945. 
With the war’s end, however, the crude birth rate rose sharply to 34.6 
in 1946, and stayed at that high level through 1949. These four years of rapid 
natural increase added about 8 million people to Japan’s population, which 
reached 83 million by 1949. In a country stripped of its former colonies, with 
soldiers and repatriates returning from abroad, and with its industrial base 
severely shattered by massive bombing, Japanese leaders feared that their 
future would be threatened by severe overpopulation. In 1948 the Japanese 
Diet passed two laws that formed the core of a comprehensive antinatalist 
policy (Norgren 2001). The Pharmaceutical Affairs Law repealed all laws 
restricting the sale and marketing of contraceptives. The Eugenic Protection 
Law legalized abortion and sterilization for the protection of the mother’s 
health. In 1949 the latter law was amended to allow abortions on grounds 
of economic hardship (ibid.: 36–46). Both contraception and abortion were 
approved as subsidized services covered by the national health plan.
The government took a clear antinatalist stance and the Supreme Com-
mand Allied Powers—the US occupation force—largely concurred with its 
assessment (Oakley 1978). In April 1949 Prime Minister Yoshida stated that 
“it was necessary for the people themselves fully to understand and practice 
the principles of birth control in order to surmount the stringent economic 
times” (Whelpton 1950: 40). On the same day a Population Problem Council 
was established in the Cabinet. In October 1949 the Council recommended 
to the Prime Minister that every couple should be “enabled” to control their 
family size “in order to prevent a tremendous increase of population which 
will influence disadvantageously the economic rehabilitation.” It also argued 
that “special efforts must be made toward enlightenment of the social class 
in which the dissemination and practice of birth control are most difficult” 
(ibid.: 41).
The passage of these laws had its desired effect. A month after the Phar-
maceutical Affairs Law was passed a variety of contraceptives was approved 
for sale, and within a year contraceptive production had greatly increased 
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(Whelpton 1950: 38–39). The Population Problems Research Council, estab-
lished by the Mainichi Newspapers in 1949, undertook three national surveys 
from 1950 to 1955 and found that the proportion of couples using contracep-
tion had increased from 29 percent to 52 percent (Taeuber 1956: 28). During 
the same period abortions rose in an even more dramatic fashion: 246,000 in 
1949; 489,000 in 1950; 638,000 in 1951; 798,000 in 1952; 1,068,000 in 1953; 
and 1,143,000 in 1954 (ibid.: 27). For the remainder of the 1950s abortions 
held at the level of 1.1 million a year (Balfour 1961: 104), and by 1959 the 
abortion ratio was 676 abortions per 1,000 live births (Davis 1963: 347). That 
the majority of Japanese women could receive a high-quality abortion at a 
cost of less than one US dollar (Taeuber 1956: 30) no doubt helped fuel this 
increase. Japan’s total fertility rate fell from 4.4 in 1948 to 2.0 by 1957, and 
remained at replacement level until 1973 (United Nations 2000). Government 
leaders, national population experts, and a committed medical establishment 
directed Japan’s antinatalist policy; family planning associations and general 
women’s organizations played minor roles (Norgren 2001: 36–52). During 
the 1950s Japan’s rapid fertility decline was heralded, both inside and outside 
the country, as a great success. 
After 1973 Japanese fertility resumed its decline, falling to 1.3 in 2006. 
Through much of this period Japanese women relied on condoms as their 
major means of contraception since the pill was not approved for contracep-
tive use until 1999 (Kihara et al. 2001). By the early 1980s, when the de-
clining TFR reached 1.7, some Japanese began to assert that restrictions on 
abortion were needed. In 1982 the Seichō no Ie, a religious organization with 
ties to nationalists and conservative Diet members, launched a “Reverence 
for Life” movement and sought to gather 10 million signatures for the repeal 
of the economic hardship clause of the Eugenic Protection Law. A coalition 
of women’s groups, trade unionists, physicians, and female members of the 
Diet, however, succeeded in preventing this radical change in the abortion 
law. Throughout the 1980s government actions indicated it was abandoning 
its antinatalist policy for a pronatalist one (Gelb 1996: 129–130). Some ac-
tions indicated a willingness to adopt very heavy-handed pronatalist policies: 
delaying approval of the pill for contraceptive use even though by 1991 it 
had been proven to be safe and effective in government trials, and attempting 
to shorten the period of uncomplicated access to abortion from 23 weeks of 
pregnancy to 21 weeks. By the early 1990s more progressive pronatalist poli-
cies were enacted, including significantly increasing monthly child support 
payments, granting either parent a one-year unpaid leave for child care after 
the birth of a child, and providing a variety of help for those wishing to com-
bine childrearing and paid work (Ogawa 2003: 102–103). In 2003 there were 
an estimated 320,000 abortions in Japan and 1,134,000 live births (Sedgh et 
al. 2007b: 110) for an abortion ratio of 282 abortions per 1,000 live births, a 
considerably lower ratio than for the peak abortion years of the 1950s. 
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Abortion and the international population  
control movement
The French and Japanese examples of an integrated abortion and population 
policy were current when the international population control movement 
began its attempt to halt the developing world’s rapid population growth 
during the 1950s and 1960s. This growth was especially problematic when 
viewed through the lens of demographic transition theory then being de-
veloped by demographers at Princeton University’s Office of Population 
Research (Hodgson 1983). If rapid population growth prevented the trans-
formation of traditional agrarian societies into modern industrial ones, then 
rapid population growth might forestall the very socioeconomic changes 
that would induce fertility decline. Without fertility decline, the developing 
world’s period of population expansion would come to an end with mortality 
rising as starvation and disease increased, changes likely to create political 
and economic chaos.  
Princeton demographers broadcast this vision of the postwar global 
population situation, and by the early 1950s John D. Rockefeller 3rd and 
eventually the leadership of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had ac-
cepted its validity. They launched a movement with a global focus. A 1962 
policy paper of the Board of Trustees of the Ford Foundation (Harkavy 1995: 
39) stated publicly their intent “to achieve breakthroughs on the problems 
of population control, including training and research in demography, the 
motivational factors in family planning, the political and social consequences 
of population control, and the pertinent areas of science, medicine and public 
health.” A year later the Rockefeller Foundation’s Population Program was so 
bold as to list its goal as “the development of the knowledge and experience 
needed to bring about reduction of the growth rate of the world’s population 
and its eventual stabilization,” a goal that Harkavy (ibid.: 44) argued “could 
have served equally well for the Ford Foundation and the Population Coun-
cil.” They hoped to lower fertility by setting up family planning programs 
that would promote the small-family norm and distribute contraceptives. 
Movement leaders recognized that only governments could implement effec-
tive family planning programs, and the leaders’ immediate task in the 1950s 
and early 1960s became to convince policymakers, in both developed and 
developing countries, that high fertility was a major social problem requiring 
state intervention. 
India officially launched a small state-sponsored family planning pro-
gram in 1952 and sought help in 1954 from the Population Council, the 
think tank of the movement, but interest was lacking in much of the rest 
of the developing world. Movement leaders needed to convince a skeptical 
and diverse set of national policymakers about the possibility and desirability 
of controlling fertility. The Cold War fears of many American and Western 
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European leaders made them susceptible to arguments about the possible 
destabilizing effects of rapid population growth in the developing world, and 
a universal desire for economic development made developing-world leaders 
susceptible to the appeal of models, such as that of Coale and Hoover (1958), 
quantifying the economic gains that would accrue from lowering fertility. Still, 
many policymakers in less densely settled regions of the world, especially in 
Latin America and Africa, were convinced that more people, not fewer, would 
help their development. 
Through much of the 1950s and early 1960s simply getting government 
leaders to publicly declare support for family planning was difficult. At the 
United Nations World Population Conference held in Rome in 1954, a coali-
tion of Catholics and Communists prevented consideration of any fertility 
control agenda. In 1959 President Dwight Eisenhower forcefully ruled out any 
use of US foreign aid funds to support birth control in developing countries, 
describing it as “not a proper political or governmental activity or function or 
responsibility” (Morris 1959: 1).
The international population control movement did have an ally in the 
effort, although one that was small and poorly funded. In 1946 Margaret 
Sanger came out of retirement in an effort to internationalize the Planned 
Parenthood movement that she had initiated in the United States decades 
earlier (Chesler 1992: 407–463). She was chair of the committee that formally 
established the International Planned Parenthood Federation in Bombay, 
India, in 1952 and she co-directed the IPPF until her retirement in 1959. 
She imprinted it with her feminist belief that birth control was essential for 
women’s equality. IPPF representatives and members of the Population Coun-
cil met in 1955, 1956, and 1957 “to develop and define general principles for 
promoting birth control overseas” (Piotrow 1973: 14). When significant funds 
for global fertility control began to flow from foundations, however, they were 
largely funneled not to the IPPF birth controllers but to movement operatives 
(ibid.: 15–18). These operatives viewed the IPPF’s moderate feminist rationale 
for family planning as a valuable supplement to their economic and politi-
cal arguments for fertility control. Personally they feared that the traditional 
male-dominated social structures of agrarian societies were organized in ways 
that induced high fertility, yet they harbored hopes that Sanger was correct in 
her belief that all women desired to control their fertility but simply lacked the 
means to do so. The IPPF’s “planned parenthood” model focused on providing 
contraceptives to women and did not include advocacy of abortion. In fact 
the IPPF, like Sanger’s earlier domestic birth control movement, promoted 
family planning as an alternative to (mostly illegal) abortion. 
In the policy environment of the 1950s and 1960s any promotion of 
abortion by the international population control movement would have 
greatly complicated its political agenda. Abortion for birth control purposes 
had yet to be legalized in any Western industrialized country, and most such 
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countries had abortion laws similar to those in place in France. Yet Japan’s 
success in halving its fertility rate in less than a decade seemed to provide the 
ideal blueprint for reining in population growth. Some experts discounted the 
applicability of the Japanese example, pointing to the country’s long tradition 
of using abortion and infanticide to control fertility (Taeuber 1958: 29–31), 
but others disagreed. Kingsley Davis argued (1963: 345–346) that the Japa-
nese abortion experience had been “the same in kind as the behavior of West 
Europeans at a similar time in their social and demographic history,” differ-
ing only in that “Japanese tolerance permits the abortion rate to be reason-
ably well known.” He found that the past prevalence of abortion in Western 
European countries and the current prevalence of abortion in the People’s 
Republics of Eastern Europe were “amazingly like that of Japan,” and that 
“there is no reason to regard the resort to abortion as peculiarly Japanese.” 
For Davis a high abortion rate is simply “a response to social and economic 
conditions arising in country after country at a particular time in the process 
of modernization.” Judith Blake, too, thought that Japanese openness held a 
lesson for others: “the Japanese were probably fortunate in not being overly 
burdened and confused in their family planning by institutionalized supersti-
tion and unreasoned fears concerning abortion” (1963: 323). But advocating 
a Japanese-style integrated antinatalist program threatened to generate sig-
nificant opposition in many potential donor and recipient countries. In the 
end, movement leaders such as John D. Rockefeller 3rd made a concerted ef-
fort in the early 1960s to gain US government support for a simple voluntary 
family planning program that would distribute contraceptives to women who 
wanted them, arguing that such a program was a necessary complement to 
the gradualist development strategies being promoted by American foreign 
aid programs. In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson promised in his State of 
the Union Message “to help deal with the explosion in the world popula-
tion” (Critchlow 2001: 71). By the end of the decade the US government 
had become the largest provider of funds for family planning programs in 
less developed countries. 
 Some developing-world political leaders needed additional persuasion 
of family planning’s necessity, especially Latin American leaders whose strong 
Catholic beliefs predisposed them to oppose contraception. In this instance 
illegal abortion provided movement leaders with an effective argument in 
generating support for family planning programs that promoted contraceptive 
practice. With infant mortality rates falling, Latin American women found 
their family sizes rapidly expanding, and they were turning to illegal abor-
tion in unprecedented numbers. Women with complications from unsanitary 
abortions were filling up hospital beds throughout Latin America. Movement 
leaders provided funds for surveys that measured the incidence of illegal abor-
tion in Latin America and quantified its health effects and medical costs. A 
1960 epidemiological study in Chile outlined the extent of the problem: “20 
abortion complications were admitted for every 100 live births in hospitals, 
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and…between 1938 and 1960 the number of abortion cases had more than 
tripled” (Stycos 1964: 371). These findings were used to persuade skeptical 
political leaders, largely “unconvinced of a population problem,” that family 
planning programs were needed as anti-abortion programs: 
Abortion complications were expensive and competing for overcrowded bed 
space and facilities. Interest in contraception increased: contraception would 
reduce abortion but not the birth rate—it was merely a substitute for abortion. 
While the rightists saw abortion as expensive, the leftists saw contraception as 
correcting class inequalities. Why should the upper classes have modern con-
traception and the lower classes abortion? A number of public hospitals quietly 
initiated contraceptive programs. (ibid.: 372)
This strategy proved successful, and by the late 1960s “implicitly or 
explicitly, all family planning programs in Latin America aim at fighting 
induced abortion as one of their principal objectives” (Requena 1968: 797). 
The strategy also helped to deal with Roman Catholic opposition since “the 
Church has not reacted aggressively” to family planning programs framed as 
anti-abortion programs (Stycos 1967: 76). In time some Latin American coun-
tries did come to believe that their chances for economic development were 
being threatened by high rates of population growth, most notably Colombia, 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador (Measham 1975: 281).
The community studies undertaken in Latin America to determine the 
extent to which a family planning program could be an effective anti-abortion 
program produced surprising results. A family planning program introduced 
in Santiago, Chile led to a significant increase in the use of both contraception 
and abortion (Faundes-Latham et al. 1968: 844). Requena and Monreal ex-
plained their similar results by hypothesizing that “women who never before 
had thought of planning their family decided to do it, following advice from 
neighbors and drug stores. This means, probably, that a very large additional 
number of women used contraceptives in a wrong way and had undesir-
able pregnancies that ended in abortion” (1968: 202). Requena developed a 
class-based explanation of the interaction of abortion and contraception: the 
lower classes were using neither, the upper classes were effective users of con-
traception and only occasionally used abortion, and the middle classes were 
intensifying their use of both contraception and abortion (1970: 381). By the 
end of the 1970s the positive relationship between abortion and contraception 
during the early stages of the fertility transition was so widely known that 
Potts, Diggory, and Peel could summarize it succinctly: “Abortion is the horse 
that pulls contraceptive practice into the community” (1977: 498). They had 
accumulated significant “epidemiological evidence that the induced abor-
tion rate rises in many (or possibly all) communities at the beginning of the 
demographic transition” (ibid.: 456).  The Japanese experience of the 1950s 
was now seen to be the common one, as Davis had argued. 
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These findings did not alter the decision of movement leaders to exclude 
advocacy of abortion. In the 1950s they were concerned about the high failure 
rate of the contraceptives then available, but they had given the Population 
Council significant funds to develop a contraceptive with the characteristics 
needed to lower developing-world birth rates: effective, inexpensive, not 
requiring repeated action, and unconnected to intercourse. The Council had 
rehabilitated an older method, the intrauterine device, and by the mid-1960s 
was manufacturing and distributing worldwide the Lippes Loop, a spiral, 
plastic IUD that could be inserted through a tube into a woman’s undilated 
cervix by a medical technician (Connelly 2008: 201–206). The members of 
the international population control movement had what they hoped was an 
inexpensive and effective contraceptive method that could accomplish their 
goal. They thought that introducing abortion into the mix would only com-
plicate matters. The United Nations already had defined “family planning” in 
exclusively contraceptive terms and presented it as a tool for combating illegal 
abortion (United Nations 1964: 30), and the movement’s use of the same 
argument in Latin America had proven effective. Although Kingsley Davis 
called family planning “a euphemism for contraception” (1967: 731) and 
thought that “family planners” were “denying the central tenet of their own 
movement” by not advocating the legalization of abortion since “abortions 
enable women to have only the number of children they want” (ibid.: 733), 
the movement did not reconsider the matter. The mid-1960s was a period 
of some optimism for the movement as increasing numbers of government 
leaders were issuing public statements supporting family planning, and even 
Pope Paul VI was reassessing whether modern methods of contraception 
contravened Catholic doctrine. 
By the end of the 1960s conditions had changed. The Pope had issued 
his encyclical, Humanae Vitae (1968), disapproving all methods of contracep-
tion, and reports of significant IUD infection rates and high removal rates 
were causing consternation in movement circles. In Taiwan only 25 percent 
of women had their original IUD in place 30 months after insertion, and more 
than 50 percent of the pregnancies experienced by women who had stopped 
using the IUD were being aborted (Potter et al. 1968: 852), although abortion 
was illegal at the time. Family planning programs had existed long enough so 
that the issue of contraceptive failure had to be faced. Dr. K. Kanagaratnam, 
then chairman of Singapore’s Family Planning and Population Board, de-
scribed the situation: “there was some embarrassment to our clinic personnel 
when women on the IUD became pregnant and wished their pregnancies to 
be terminated…. [N]othing much could be done but to urge the women to 
continue their pregnancy” (1968: 6). The Board recommended that “failed 
contraception” be made a legal reason for granting a woman a right to abor-
tion. Singapore went on to legalize abortion in 1970. 
Abortion, with various duration-of-pregnancy limits and rationales, was 
also being legalized throughout much of the developed world at the time: 
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Great Britain in 1967, Canada in 1969, the United States in 1973, France 
and Austria in 1975, New Zealand in 1977, and Italy in 1978. In 1972 India 
liberalized its laws to permit abortions for economic or social reasons dur-
ing the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. If the international population control 
movement had not been facing extraordinary challenges in the 1970s, these 
legalizations might have provoked a second look at its contraception-only def-
inition of family planning. But serious challenges were occurring that largely 
foreclosed that possibility. In the 1960s national policymakers had embraced 
family planning for a variety of reasons related to geopolitical circumstances, 
economic development, resource limitations, maternal health, and illegal 
abortion. Movement leaders had planned that the World Population Confer-
ence at Bucharest in 1974 would be the place where the world would unite 
behind a single population agenda: lowering high fertility (Finkle and Crane 
1975: 87). This, however, did not happen. The movement’s family planning 
agenda did not unite the world, it divided it. The head of the Indian delega-
tion asserted that “development is the best contraceptive” and was greeted 
with “the acclaim of most Third World participants” (Ford Foundation 1985: 
18). Behind that slogan was a questioning of motives, a questioning of why 
family planning was the one activity for which a Third World government 
could easily find First World monetary support (Piotrow 1973: 145–158). 
Developing countries wanted more than contraceptives: they wanted a new 
world economic order that would bring real development. The “Plan of Ac-
tion” eventually adopted at Bucharest was a developmentalist one. Population 
control was not presumed to be a necessary prerequisite for development. 
Development itself would motivate couples to have small families. As such, 
a population control policy only made sense if solidly ensconced within a 
broader policy of economic and social development. 
The 1970s proved to be a difficult time for the international population 
movement. John D. Rockefeller 3rd publicly converted to the developmen-
talist position at Bucharest (Rockefeller 1974: 4). There was a leadership 
upheaval at the Population Council. Both the Ford and Rockefeller Founda-
tions reduced their funding for population activities, virtually ending it by 
1980. US government spending on population reached major proportions by 
the early 1970s, more than replacing lost foundation funds, but American 
presidential politics, largely surrounding the issue of abortion, began to af-
fect how those funds were spent. The politics began even before the 1973 Roe 
v. Wade Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion in the United States. In 
1969 President Richard Nixon called for the establishment of a Commission 
on Population Growth and the American Future and appointed Rockefeller 
to head it. Yet when the Rockefeller Commission Report appeared in 1972, 
calling for state laws to be liberalized to allow “abortion to be performed on 
request,” President Nixon quickly disassociated himself from its findings. He 
saw “a political opportunity to lure Catholic voters away from the Demo-
cratic party” by pursing what the White House called “The Catholic Strat-
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egy” (Critchlow 1996: 14). He denounced Democratic presidential candidate 
George McGovern for his support for legal access to abortion and won a 
landslide election victory in 1972. In many ways this strategy became a model 
followed by future Republican presidential candidates. 
Restrictions on family planning funding followed Roe v. Wade. That deci-
sion spawned a Right-to-Life movement that within two years had become a 
national organization with significant political strength (Paige 1983) and had 
aligned itself with the Republican party. Although a constitutional amend-
ment outlawing abortion proved beyond its reach, the movement was able 
to have laws passed forbidding the use of public funds for abortion and to 
convince a significant proportion of politicians to publicly oppose abortion. 
In 1974 explicit abortion restrictions were placed on USAID family planning 
aid by the amendment of section 114 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(P.L. 93–189): “None of the funds made available to carry out this part [Part I 
of the Act] shall be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method 
of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.” 
Passage of the 1974 amendment had practical significance since new abor-
tion techniques were emerging that greatly enhanced the potential utility of 
abortion as a family planning method (Crane 1994: 245). USAID’s Office of 
Population, then under the direction of the ardent population controller R. 
T. Ravenholt, had been funding the development of a “Menstrual Regula-
tion Kit” for use in developing countries. Menstrual regulation (also called 
menstrual extraction, menstrual induction, and endometrial aspiration) 
was a new procedure performed within two weeks of missed menses using 
a narrow, flexible plastic suction curette. Women whose missed menses was 
caused by pregnancy would experience a very early abortion. This procedure 
is quick, can be performed by paraprofessionals at low cost, and has a very 
low complication rate. It was first used under field conditions to treat Bangla-
deshi women who had been raped by Pakistani soldiers during the civil war 
of 1971. To Ravenholt, at least, it seemed a method of birth regulation ideally 
suited for integration into developing-world family planning programs; and 
considering the limited funds then available for support of family planning 
programs internationally, it was probably the only form of abortion capable 
of being supported financially by the United States. The 1974 amendment, 
however, ended USAID involvement in its further development and promo-
tion (National Security Council 1974: Part 2, Section 4, B, “Abortion”). 
With the US government contributing such a large fraction of inter-
national family planning funds, the abortion funding restrictions had a 
considerable international impact. Still, the decade after Bucharest saw Com-
munist opposition to neo-Malthusianism lessen substantially, more countries 
establish family planning programs, and the pace of fertility decline acceler-
ate. Some thought that the International Conference on Population held 
in Mexico City in 1984 might be the occasion at which fertility control was 
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universally acclaimed. But American abortion politics prevented consensus 
from developing. In 1979 the National Right to Life Movement had 11 mil-
lion members and “the pro-life movement became a major political force in 
the presidential election of 1980, which put Ronald Reagan into the White 
House” (Critchlow 1996: 16). In his first term Reagan denounced abortion 
and appointed bureaucrats to federal agencies with little commitment to a 
family planning agenda, domestic or international. An international popula-
tion conference in 1984, an election year, was politically troublesome. Any 
talk of population problems by Reagan-appointed delegates would be inter-
preted by anti-abortion social conservatives as opening the door to abortion 
and state-mandated contraception. Reagan appointed delegates who fol-
lowed the revisionist views of Julian Simon (1977, 1981) by declaring that 
there was no world population problem. They did, however, believe that the 
increasing legalization of abortion constituted an international problem. The 
US delegates voted with the Vatican to amend the Plan of Action to prohibit 
promoting abortion “as a method of family planning,” and used the occasion 
to announce a new US “Mexico City Policy” aimed at curtailing the spread of 
abortion. An international NGO wanting family planning funds from USAID, 
the largest donor source of such funds, had to avoid even the mention of 
abortion in its programs. This policy made any coordination of population 
and abortion policies more difficult.
The formulation of international population policy underwent a sea 
change from 1984 to 1994. Population control lost its salience on the inter-
national agenda. Population growth itself was abating, the end of the Cold 
War had dispelled many of the political fears surrounding such growth, and 
academic research had lessened worries about its economic effects. The inter-
national population control movement lacked ideas for regaining momentum. 
By the time delegates met at the 1994 Cairo conference, a new direction for 
the movement had gained force. A group of American reproductive health 
feminists had been successful in uniting a large bloc of feminists and much 
of what remained of the population control establishment into a common-
ground alliance (Hodgson and Watkins 1997). The Programme of Action ad-
opted at Cairo (United Nations 1995) embodied its major terms: redressing 
gender inequities is needed for lasting fertility control, and women have 
reproductive rights to freely determine their reproductive destinies. Contro-
versy did erupt over whether the Programme of Action should include abortion 
in its definition of the “reproductive health care” that all governments should 
provide. Paragraph 7.6 defines reproductive health care and does include a 
reference to abortion, but the Vatican, after marshaling enough anti-abor-
tion support among country delegations to place the consensus ratification of 
the Programme of Action in doubt, succeeded in inserting into the Programme 
(Paragraph 8.25) the old abortion language of the Mexico City conference: “In 
no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.” The 
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advance that reproductive rights advocates achieved was to have Paragraph 
8.5 also acknowledge the existence of legal abortion and the need for quality 
reproductive health care: “In circumstances where abortion is not against the 
law, such abortion should be safe.” 
Upon becoming president in 1993 Bill Clinton immediately rescinded 
Reagan’s Mexico City Policy. He restored financing to IPPF and UNFPA, ad-
opted an unequivocal pro-choice position, and went on to ratify US support 
for reproductive rights goals for the Cairo conference. In the end, though, 
he had the US delegation go along with the Vatican-inspired compromise 
on abortion’s role in family planning and reproductive health programs. In 
1999 pro-life Republican congressmen refused to appropriate funds to pay 
UN dues and forced from President Clinton a further compromise: a par-
tial reinstatement of some Mexico City Policy restrictions (Schmitt 1999). 
Upon becoming president in 2001 George W. Bush immediately reinstated 
the Mexico City Policy in full. He withheld funding from IPPF and UNFPA, 
adopted an unequivocal pro-life position, and worked with Christian Right 
groups to increase their presence at international population and women’s 
forums (Butler 2006). For eight years the Bush administration denied funding 
to any international NGO that provided information, counseling, or referrals 
about abortion services or that lobbied a government to reform its abortion 
laws (USAID 2008). It also prohibited any population expert in the US employ 
from speaking about abortion as a method of family planning. During these 
years many participants at international population conferences withheld 
their candid assessments about the appropriate relationship between abortion 
policy and population policy (Crane and Dusenberry 2004). Because of the 
desire for consensus when approving “plans of action,” and because of the 
insistence of US representatives that abortion not be discussed as a method 
of family planning, these plans invariably included the two directives of the 
common-ground approach: “in no case should [abortion] be promoted as a 
method of family planning,” and the need “to reduce the recourse to abortion 
through expanded and improved family-planning services.” The contempo-
rary appropriateness of these directives, however, was never discussed in an 
explicit manner. 
But even during the Bush years, questions of appropriateness were 
increasingly being alluded to in international documents and conferences. 
For instance, in 2003 the World Health Organization published Safe Abortion, 
a technical guide to help “train and equip health-service providers” in the 
provision of safe and accessible abortions in countries “where abortion is 
not against the law.” Although noting in its appendix (2003: 100–101) the 
standard two directives of the common-ground approach, its introductory 
chapter presented a powerful argument for integrating legal abortion into 
family planning programs. It made provocative observations, such as that 
“even where family planning is widely accessible, pregnancies occur due 
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to contraceptive failure” (ibid.: 12–13). Such observations seem designed 
to raise “inappropriate” questions: Why do family planning programs fail 
to make provisions for the contraceptive failures that are bound to happen 
in all programs? Where in the Program of Action documents that call on 
countries to implement family planning programs can one find a section 
dealing with contraceptive failure? Is there a way other than abortion for 
an individual, or a family planning program, to deal effectively with con-
traceptive failure? Back in 1968 when the chairman of Singapore’s Family 
Planning and Population Board faced this issue, he tried to have abortion 
legalized for the reason of contraceptive failure. Yet would not the sugges-
tion of such a use of abortion at a contemporary international population 
meeting be problematic since it so clearly entails promoting abortion as a 
method of family planning? 
Safe Abortion went on to quantify the health tragedy associated with the 
20 million unsafe, largely illegal abortions occurring each year: 70,000 women 
dying while “tens of thousands suffer long-term health consequences” (WHO 
2003: 7). In a similar fashion, when African ministers of health convened in 
Maputo, Mozambique in 2006 and produced a Plan of Action on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Rights (African Union Commission 2006: 3), they too 
presented a dramatic list of unfavorable statistics: “1 million maternal and 
newborn deaths annually, an African woman having a 1 in 16 chance of 
dying while giving birth; high unmet need for family planning with rapid 
population growth often outstripping economic growth and the growth of 
basic social services (education and health), thus contributing to the vicious 
cycle of poverty and ill-health.” Such documents that detail adverse popula-
tion and health statistics—especially those mentioning the high rates of death 
and disability associated with illegal abortions—all raise additional “inappro-
priate” questions, even when the common-ground directives are repeated 
alongside the list. Yet permitting unintended pregnancies to be terminated 
with a legal abortion, a seemingly obvious response to such statistics, would 
entail “promoting abortion as a method of family planning.” The fact that Safe 
Abortion, which is after all a WHO technical guide for abortion providers in 
countries where abortion is legal, would provide such a comprehensive list 
of the consequences of what are overwhelmingly illegal abortions seems to 
suggest that the authors of the work were also arriving at that conclusion. The 
fact that African health ministers in response to their list of adverse statistics 
went on to recommend (African Union Commission 2006: 13) that every ef-
fort be made to “provide safe abortion services to the fullest extent of the law” 
and to “educate communities on available safe abortion services as allowed 
by national laws” seems to suggest that they too were drawing “inappropri-
ate” conclusions even while referencing the correctness of Paragraph 8.25 of 
the Cairo Programme of Action where the common-ground directives about 
abortion are contained. 
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The prospects for a new common-ground 
approach to abortion and population policy
More and more documents like the two mentioned at the conclusion of 
the previous section are seeking to raise significant questions about the 
appropriateness of the established common-ground approach to abortion, 
family planning, and population policy. The main contradiction contained 
in international population conference documents, however, has yet to 
be confronted. Program of Action population documents since 1984 have 
urged countries with high fertility to lower it by implementing effective 
family planning programs while simultaneously maintaining that “in no 
case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning,” and that 
governments should “reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and 
improved family-planning services.” Yet it has been known since the 1960s, 
and particularly widely known since the 1970s, that countries undergoing 
the fertility transition can expect, almost without exception, to experience 
increases in both contraceptive use and induced abortion. These increases 
in abortion have always involved women using abortion as a means of birth 
control, and countries experiencing rapid fertility declines have consistently 
had large increases in abortion. These inconvenient facts have never been 
addressed at international population conferences. The Cairo+10 documents 
(UNFPA 2005: 76–77) contain a sophisticated treatment of the stages of the 
fertility transition as they relate to population aging, and even include policy 
responses to potential problems. But there has been no treatment of the 
stages of the fertility transition as they relate to the use of contraception and 
induced abortion. This is not an inconsequential issue. Sixty-two countries 
have adopted the Cairo Programme of Action policy suggestions and have a 
policy to lower fertility while not permitting abortion to be used as a means 
of family planning (see Table 1). This 27 percent of the world’s population has 
a higher maternal mortality ratio, a higher total fertility rate, and a higher per 
capita income than the 20 percent of the world’s population that is attempting 
to lower fertility while permitting uncomplicated access to abortion. These 
inconvenient facts would seem to warrant serious examination by all those 
interested in reducing maternal mortality.  
On 23 January 2009 Barack Obama, as one of his first acts as president, 
rescinded the Mexico City Policy and stated that he would work to restore 
US funding for UNFPA (Obama 2009). In his statement he called for “a fresh 
conversation on family planning, working to find areas of common ground to 
best meet the needs of women and families at home and around the world.” 
He enunciated a “goal of reducing unintended pregnancies” and noted a need 
to reduce rates of maternal mortality. Although one of the principal aims 
of the Mexico City Policy was to exclude abortion from such conversation, 
President Obama bypassed the question of how he would integrate the topic 
of abortion into his fresh conversation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
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responding to a question while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee in April, was more explicit about her position on abortion’s place 
in this fresh conversation (France 24 2009): 
When I think about the suffering that I have seen of women around the world, 
I’ve been in hospitals in Brazil where half the women were enthusiastically 
and joyfully greeting new babies and the other half were fighting for their lives 
against botched abortions.… We happen to think that family planning is an 
important part of women’s health, and reproductive health includes access to 
abortion, that I believe should be safe, legal and rare.
Secretary Clinton’s extemporaneous remarks argue for provision of uncom-
plicated access to safe and legal abortions. Of course, by saying this she has 
already ignored the first common-ground directive: “in no case should abor-
tion be promoted as a method of family planning.” 
The United States is still the largest single donor of funds for interna-
tional family planning, expending approximately $460 million in FY2009. 
These funds are likely to increase to well over $600 million in FY2010 (Fleisch-
man and Moore 2009: 6). The United States had been the most conscientious 
enforcer of the common-ground approach to abortion for most of the past 
quarter-century; now it is willing to talk about abortion, family planning, and 
population policy. These facts guarantee that treatment of this topic will no 
longer be so firmly bracketed by the two common-ground directives about 
abortion. With no follow-up international conference on population and de-
velopment planned after Cairo, it is unclear whether these old directives can 
be formally changed or rescinded. They can, however, be ignored. 
But there remain crucial differences between abortion and contracep-
tion. In the past the United States encouraged countries to adopt family 
planning programs by offering economic incentives for this purpose. It is ex-
tremely unlikely the United States would offer any economic encouragements 
to countries to liberalize their abortion policies. This does not mean, however, 
that reducing the relevance of the common-ground directives will have no 
impact on abortion policies. New, open conversation on abortion may lead to 
change in abortion policies, especially in one set of countries.
Table 2 presents the current combinations of fertility and abortion 
policies in 179 countries with a population of at least 100,000. Two primary 
“stress points” in these combinations occur where abortion policies are not 
structured to further countries’ population policies: first, within the 62 
countries with a policy to lower fertility that also restrict women’s access to 
abortion; and second, within the 30 countries with a policy to raise fertility 
that also grant women uncomplicated access to abortion. These stress points 
raise serious policy concerns to the extent that the lack of integration is the 
cause of significant problems for the countries involved. When problems oc-
cur, lobbying and “education” efforts to promote change in abortion policy 
may be effective. 
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In the near term the most significant stress point is the first: in countries 
with a policy to lower fertility and a policy that restricts access to abortion. As 
discussed earlier, this is a “natural” stress point in that success of the fertility 
policy would lead to a rapid drop in desired family size and an increase in 
unwanted pregnancies, even as contraceptive use is increasing. Significant 
problems would ensue as women with unwanted pregnancies confront the 
restrictive abortion policy, resort to illegal abortions, and suffer serious health 
consequences. As was the case in the now low-fertility countries, the likely 
solution to these problems would be to make illegal abortions into legal ones. 
Other solutions are difficult to identify. Improving hospital care for women 
suffering the consequences of illegal abortion is unlikely ever to eliminate the 
significant health disparities between illegal and legal abortion. Considering 
the weak state apparatus of most of these countries, enforcement of restrictive 
abortion laws offers no feasible solution. 
TABLE 2 Cross-tabulation of countries’ 2007 fertility policy by 
whether or not countries permit abortion on request or for economic 
or social reasons, 2007
     Percent 
     of world 
  
Abortion permitted on 
 Total in population 
  
request or for economic
 fertility   in fertility 
Policy to modify 
or social reasons
 policy  policy 
fertility level Yes No category category
Lower
Number of countries 10 62 72
Percent of countries 14 86 100 47
Percent of population 43 57 100
Raise
Number of countries 30 7 37
Percent of countries 81 19 100 13
Percent of population 83 17 100
Maintain
Number of countries 13 18 31
Percent of countries 42 58 100 26
Percent of population 88 12 100
No intervention
Number of countries 14 25 39
Percent of countries 36 64 100 15
Percent of population 49 51 100
Total
Number of countries 67 112 179
Percent of all countries 37 63 100 100
Percent of world population 61 40 100
SOURCE: See Figure 1.
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The second stress point is not as significant at the present time, and of 
uncertain significance in the future. The 30 countries with a policy to raise 
fertility and a policy that gives women uncomplicated access to abortion 
have on average a negative annual growth rate (–0.1 percent) and a below-
replacement total fertility rate (1.4). Twenty-four of them are European, of 
which 12 are now in their third decade of below-replacement fertility. The 
problematic effects of such low fertility on age structure, social security costs, 
health care costs, and labor force needs have been widely publicized. They 
present religious and other opponents of abortion and nationalists worried 
about the presumed debilitating effects of population decline an opportunity 
to try to end liberal abortion policies, now held to be a major cause of low 
fertility. A more restrictive abortion policy, it could be argued, is needed for 
the social good. To date, such attempts to exploit this stress point have not 
met with success. In most of these countries the reproductive rights move-
ment has been strong for decades, extensive legislation protects a woman’s 
right to control her fertility, and often a state-supported health care system 
provides access to contraception and abortion as part of routine medical ser-
vices (David 1992).
The existence of these two policy stress points illustrates a significant 
way in which abortion differs from contraception. There is no longer much 
debate about the nature of contraception or on the proposition that couples 
have the right to practice contraception to control their fertility. However, 
substantive debate remains about the nature of induced abortion, and govern-
ment leaders are far from a consensus about the proposition that all women 
should have uncomplicated access to abortion. The persistence of different 
interpretations of abortion, in fact, explains why the stress points referred 
to above exist and why abortion policies are enacted that do not further the 
state’s fertility policy. Policymakers in a number of low-fertility European 
countries refuse to consider limiting a woman’s access to abortion because 
they define access to abortion as a woman’s right that must be protected by 
the state. Policymakers in a number of Latin American countries with still 
comparatively high fertility and active programs to distribute contraceptives 
refuse to liberalize their highly restrictive abortion policy because they define 
abortion as the taking of a human life. 
The persistence of conflicting views on abortion indicates that cultural, 
religious, and political traditions still influence the make-up of abortion poli-
cies around the world in significant ways. The fact that some 37 percent of 
the world’s population live in countries whose abortion policies are not struc-
tured to further their fertility goals is a measure of that influence. Even where 
states grant women uncomplicated access to abortion, more than a few are 
making abortion illegal when the intent to abort a pregnancy is based solely 
on knowledge of the sex of the fetus. In the 1990s China, India, and Vietnam 
banned the use of ultrasonography and other techniques to identify the sex of 
fetuses for purposes of abortion. More recently China, Nepal, and Italy have 
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simply outlawed abortion for purposes of sex selection (Boland and Katzive 
2008: 111–113), and more countries are considering such legislation. With 
respect to abortion, therefore, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the 
state should protect an individual right or a perceived social interest. With 
respect to contraception such debates are largely things of the past. Reproduc-
tive rights advocates find this particular abortion debate especially unsettling. 
All find sex-selective abortion of female fetuses morally reprehensible, but 
not all agree that it should be outlawed. Many, in fact, “are convinced that 
outlawing sex-selective abortion will undermine the reproductive rights of 
women” (Chamie 2008).
If a Program of Action is drafted at some future international confer-
ence on population, say in 2024, what would constitute a defensible com-
mon-ground approach to abortion, family planning, and population policy? 
Arguably, such an approach will still be needed. The divergent viewpoints 
on abortion associated with religious and cultural traditions show no sign of 
disappearing and are likely to determine the positions of policymakers well 
into the future. Policy is always made at the national level and the most that 
a conference on population can achieve is to arrive at a set of recommenda-
tions that might encourage countries to bend policies in the direction of some 
higher principles rather than simply reflecting prevailing national interests. 
Cairo’s Programme of Action focused on furthering reproductive health and 
on ensuring that women have the central role in determining their own 
fertility. That the representatives of scores of countries pledged to formulate 
their population policies in light of these higher principles is widely seen as 
Cairo’s greatest accomplishment. Preserving these goals would no doubt be 
central to any new Program of Action. What was problematic about Cairo’s 
common-ground directives, however, was that they also implicitly acknowl-
edged another higher principle—that fetuses have rights that place limits on 
a woman’s right to control her fertility—which actively thwarted the pursuit 
of these goals in major ways. They made it difficult to discuss pressing issues 
that affect the health and reproductive rights of millions of women: how to 
deal with contraceptive failure and how to deal in a healthful way with the 
millions of unwanted pregnancies associated with populations rapidly un-
dergoing their fertility transitions. At international forums powerful actors 
used these directives to preclude discussion of the role that liberalizing access 
to abortion might play in advancing the goals of reproductive health and 
reproductive rights. The United States in particular used its position as the 
largest single donor of funds for international family planning programs to 
inhibit discussion of abortion outside of international forums, compounding 
the setback to reproductive rights goals. 
A lesson from the Cairo experience is that the worldwide liberalization of 
abortion policy serves to enhance reproductive health and reproductive rights 
only if the states adopting more liberal abortion policies actually have a com-
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mitment to furthering reproductive health and reproductive rights. This has 
not always been the case. In 1972 India liberalized its abortion policy to permit 
abortion for economic or social reasons but then in 1976 initiated a forced 
sterilization campaign. China has allowed abortion on request for decades, 
but has also coerced women with wanted pregnancies to undergo abortions 
(Connelly 2008). A country’s commitment to reproductive health and repro-
ductive rights cannot necessarily be measured by its policy on abortion. 
The reproductive rights movement took hold when most countries 
were still focused on the need to lower fertility. Reproductive rights advo-
cates wanted to enhance women’s ability to control their fertility, and states 
wanted to lower birth rates. There was a meshing of interests in that giving 
women greater access to birth control promised to accomplish both goals. 
The problem with this close linkage for reproductive rights advocates, one 
addressed in previous Program of Action documents, was how to rein in state 
enthusiasm for fertility control so that women would not be forced to have 
smaller families than they wanted. As the twenty-first century progresses 
there will be less and less linkage between state and movement interests. A 
growing number of states will experience low fertility and will adopt policies 
to increase it. Since this “problematic” low fertility is commonly accepted as 
an expression of the actual fertility desires of women, given their social and 
economic circumstances, there will be much greater potential for direct con-
flict between state goals and movement goals. Can states induce higher fertil-
ity while still respecting the reproductive rights of women? Doing so without 
coercion requires authentic state commitment to principles of reproductive 
rights. European states have generally implemented pronatalist policies by 
seeking to ensure that every woman has the means to have all the children 
that she desires. They have instituted programs that allow women to more 
easily participate in the labor force and have children, or that provide them 
with a portion of the costs associated with rearing a child. Such programs, sen-
sitive to reproductive rights issues, are expensive and so far have not proven 
especially effective. What will happen when more states with a weaker com-
mitment to reproductive rights principles seek to increase their fertility? States 
can undertake, and have undertaken, unilateral changes in fertility and abor-
tion policies that suddenly strip women of access to both contraception and 
abortion, the most notorious example being Communist Romania’s 23-year 
experiment in seeking to raise the birth rate (Baban 1999). A low-fertility 
future promises significant new challenges that can only be effectively dealt 
with by a continuing attention to women’s reproductive rights.
What of the common-ground approach being sought by the Obama ad-
ministration: the goal of making abortion safe, legal, and rare? Domestically, it 
is by no means clear that the gulf between pro-life and pro-choice advocates can 
be bridged by that formulation. Early signs are not encouraging. Internation-
ally, there are fertility and family formation trends that will make “rareness” 
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difficult to achieve: fertility is continuing to fall significantly, and marriage and 
childbearing are taking place at later ages. An increasing portion of the world’s 
women are finding themselves in a situation comparable to that currently 
experienced by women in developed countries: sexual activity is initiated well 
before children are wanted; childbearing is postponed to later ages; and the 
desired number of children is falling to low levels. More women, therefore, 
are finding themselves with an increasing number of years in which they are 
fecund and sexually active but want no children. Abortion has played a far 
from trivial role in how women in industrialized countries have accomplished 
and are accomplishing their new fertility goals: currently women in developed 
countries, compared to those in developing countries, have both a higher frac-
tion of pregnancies that are said to be unintended (56 percent vs. 42 percent) 
and a higher fraction of all pregnancies ending in abortion (41 percent vs. 23 
percent) (Bongaarts and Westoff 2000: 194). This is true even though con-
traceptive prevalence rates are considerably higher in developed countries. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how abortion can be expected to become “rare” 
internationally as more of the world’s women adopt this new fertility regime.
Absent the condition of rarity, the issue of legality (and thereby safety) 
of abortion will remain prominent, and those negotiating a new common-
ground approach to abortion, family planning, and population policy in the 
international arena will face substantial challenges. In the near term it seems 
likely that the commitment to reproductive health and reproductive rights 
will gradually spread to more countries, with “common ground” attained 
mainly by the weakening of opposition to legal access to abortion, if under 
varying degrees of constraint. However, ensuring that individual women have 
the central role in determining their own fertility is not something that can 
be accomplished once and for all, especially in light of the spread of below-
replacement fertility. It is a goal that each generation has to struggle to attain 
for itself.
Notes
I thank all the anonymous reviewers for their 
many insightful comments, criticisms, addi-
tional references, and suggested changes. The 
end result is an article that is quite different 
from the initial version, and one that is much 
improved.
1 The accuracy of the figures for legal 
abortions is open to question. A recent press 
report from the state-run newspaper China 
Daily (2009) states that 13 million abortions 
are performed each year in China, and sug-
gests that “the real number of abortions is 
much higher than reported.” This estimate 
of 13 million abortions is considerably higher 
than the 7,215,000 reported for 2003 by Sedge 
et al., although that number was “obtained 
from the Ministry of Health” (2007b: 111). 
Interestingly, both sources caution that since 
medication abortions and many abortions 
performed at private clinics are missing from 
official counts, their reported numbers are 
likely to be significant undercounts.
2 The WHO ultimately classifies “unsafe” 
abortions as “illegal” abortions (2007: 7): “The 
relative safety of unsafe abortion differs by 
country depending on the skills of the provid-
ers and the methods used, but is also linked 
to the de facto application of the law. The 
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